Likewise, Africa's AIDS epidemic continues to intensify. According to a December 1998 United Nations update, 70% of all new HIV infections occur in sub-Saharan Africa, and 80% of all AIDS deaths occur there. The disease takes away young adults in their most productive years with devastating effects. Infection rates in some countries in southern Africa, which is severely infected, are estimated at 20%-26% of people aged 15-49. 6 Many argue that even though Africa is making progress in many areas, most outside perceptions of the region focus on violent, dramatic events, primarily through media coverage.
A preventative policy to favorably shape the environment is overshadowed repeatedly by a reactive response triggered by the "CNN effect". When the international community views images of regional devastation on television, a call for humanitarian assistance usually follows.
Despite such perceptions of on-going crises, more and more African governments are being held accountable to their citizens; economic policies are empowering a growing private sector; and there is real progress in addressing difficult but solvable problems. The international community, particularly the United States, has a vested interest in the promotion of national values in the region. As the leading advocate for democracy, economic expansion by the way of free markets, and observance of human rights, the United States must take the lead in supporting peace, prosperity, and regional stability in Africa.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
US African policy is often controversial, with debate typically centering on whether a particular administration is doing too much or too little in a region with no US vital interests. Prior to the end of the Cold War, Soviet interests and apartheid issues greatly influenced US policy objectives. With the reduction if not elimination of Cold War tensions and some alleviation of African racial tensions, the US continues to push for numerous reforms, such as promoting democracy and free-market economies.
The Clinton administration, decidedly optimistic, stressed Africa's potential as a US trading partner, emphasizing the growing importance of oil imports from the region and the possibilities for increased exports and investment there. Africa has vast resources, over 700 million people, and is potentially a very promising new market for investment and trade in this decade. Currently 150,000 American jobs depend on trade with Africa. Trade is steadily increasing, while US imports greatly exceed what is exported to Africa. The US had over 22.4 billion in trade with Africa in 1999:13% of US foreign oil imports come from Africa, more oil from West Africa than from the Persian Gulf. 7 All of this indicates some progress in this complex, diverse region characterized by rapid change. The Clinton administration recognized that Africa faced continuing economic problems and disruptive conflicts in a number of nation states. Thus the 1999 US National Security policy objectives for sub-Saharan Africa seek to promote security, economic prosperity, and democracy. The US also has a number of other trans-national interests in Africa, such as preventing weapons proliferation, preserving environmental resources of global importance, preventing human rights violations, and preventing international terrorism.
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NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
The present National Military Strategy, derived from the National Security Strategy, is designed to promote peace and stability. 9 Even though the Department of Defense declares that the US has "very little traditional strategic interest in Africa,' the US has intervened militarily in the region more that twenty times since 1990.
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The role of the US military is extremely important in Africa since many African leaders depend greatly on their military to maintain their positions of power. Thus many African countries need military support to sustain an environment wherein "democracy" and "free market" trade may be allowed to emerge. US success in promoting peace and stability, thereby promoting security and economic prosperity, will have a large impact on achieving the third US objective, promoting democracy abroad.
The policy objective of promoting regional stability depends on two underpinning military objectives. The first and possibly the most important broad objective is the promotion of internal stability in these nations as well as providing stability to the entire region through democratization and military professionalism. Since militaries are necessary elements of power for emerging nations, Africa cannot afford inefficient or undisciplined ones. The second objective is to relieve suffering by providing prompt response to humanitarian crises, which usually result from having failed to achieve the first objective; this is done at considerably more expense.
Africa is a relatively isolated region, thousands of miles from the US and Europe. The US military has limited resources available for dealing with Africa's large problems. The force structure in the European Command area of operations provides only the minimal resources necessary to support the military strategies in this theater (Europe and sub-Saharan Africa).
Resources available for African operations are even more constrained. US decision-makers are hard pressed to choose between protecting important US interests and promoting humanitarian interests. Always they must decide what ways and means should be applied to achieve given ends. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE
ACRI began as bilateral training program before the OAU or the international community had settled on a unified approach. As crises continued to occur, the ACRI and its training partners deemed it wise to start preparing for the inevitable crises as soon as possible. Also none of the ACRI training precludes a broader African approach, whether at regional or subregional levels. So it was a prudent decision to begin strengthening African peacekeeping capacity immediately, paving the way for cooperation and coordination to continue among nations. 16 However if the ACRI concept is to remain viable it must expand. Likewise African nations must continue to take further unilateral initiatives to develop and enhance peace operations capabilities. Trained units of the African states may effectively participate in peacekeeping operations. But Africa as a region will continue to rely on the United Nations, the United States,
and Western Europe to fund, organize, and support any future peacekeeping operations.
Increased western resources are especially necessary if a peace-enforcement capacity (which the donor countries have so far shied away from) is to be achieved. But western assistance for enhanced effectiveness in this endeavor will not and should not increase without corresponding
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improvements in African legitimacy.
FRANCE'S RESPONSE
The United States, France, and the United Kingdom have agreed to work together in promoting a joint initiative to strengthen the capacity of Africa countries to participate in peacekeeping under the auspices of the OAU and the UN. This joint initiative is based on four principles:
Long Term Capacity enhancement: The objective of the initiative is the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, particularly the capacity to mount rapid and effective collective response to humanitarian and other crises, consistent with the objectives and the parameters established with the UN standby arrangements. This goal will be achieved through coordinated and sustained efforts to increase interoperability through training, joint exercises and the development of common peacekeeping doctrine. There is no intention of creating a standing African force. The activities undertaken under this initiative should be the ones that enjoy the support of the African countries themselves.
Legitimacy: These activities will be carried out in consultation and coordination with the OAU and UN. The OAU and UN secretariats will be involved in the coordination of training activities.
Openness: All African states will be able to participate, with the exception of those states subject to sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.
Potential international donors will also be invited to associate themselves with the initiative. Such donors will be free to determine the states with which they intend to cooperate in specific projects without being constrained to contribute, financially or otherwise, to a project with which they do not agree.
Transparency:
There will be full transparency vis-ä-vis the international community, and, in particular, to African and other donor states. We shall seek to establish an African peacekeeping support group, bring together the OAU, UN, African member states and potential donors in New York.
-Department of State -Principles of Peacekeeping France, as the US, also made a major shift in strategic thinking about African Security Close coordination and cooperation in peacekeeping techniques was put to the test during this exercise, which employed modern equipment, logistics, air support, and transport supplied by the French military.
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The ACRI concept should also be evaluated during a regional peacekeeping exercise similar to "Guidmakha". For example, regional exercise, Natural Fire, was conducted in 1998 involving Kenya, Kenya, Uganda (ACRI battalion), and Tanzania, focusing on peacekeeping operations. The success of the exercise was probably a major factor in convincing Kenya to participate in ACRI. The JCS exercise series, known as Flintlock, conducted with a regional focus in Africa, could possibly be expanded and structured to exercise the militaries, which have 20 completed ACRI training.
Even though conceptually ACRI and RECAMP have many similarities, there are two major differences: ACRI seeks to enhance internal African peacekeeping skills, and has been coordinated bilaterally. Although ACRI trains individual nations' militaries, one of the program's aims is to create a peacekeeping capability that can be adapted by regional and sub-regional organizations. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is particularly interested in this kind of security architecture and is particularly interested in the way the US responds to crisis in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 21 On the other hand, RECAMP claims to operate through sub-regional organizations in Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS. Further RECAMP, unlike ACRI, is pre-positioning a fairly substantial amount of equipment in Africa for potential use by African peacekeeping forces.
Finally the ACRi initiative, unlike RECAMP, distributes a fairly large amount of non-lethal equipment, which is issued directly to the participating countries. 
EMPLOYMENT OF ACRI FORCES
Continuing political oversight as well as command and control and actual deployment and employment of ACRI might be handled in several ways: First, ACRI could become a UN operation approved by the Security Council, paid for by UN assessments. Second, it could be a multinational force operation, hopefully approved by the Security Council, again funded by UN assessments. Third it could be a sub-regional organization designed to conduct peacekeeping in its sub-region, funded sub-regionally, and hopefully seeking the approval of the Security Council for specific operations. Finally it could be an OAU peacekeeping operation.
The UN experimentally supported with the notion of robust humanitarian operations in early 1990s, but the Security council-after the Somalia operation-seems to have lost its ability to garner the political will of possible contributing countries for such operations: This hesitancy was clearly displayed by the failure to act in Rwanda. Moreover, the UN lacks the ability to coordinate and deploy a true enforcement operation, capable of sustaining combat operations that might be needed to conduct UN Charter Chapter VII operations. Given the UN's shortcomings, the unlikely prospects of radical Security Council reform or restructuring, and the unwillingness of the international community to provide large amounts of resources (particularly direct military intervention), the UN will simply fail to meet many of Africa's security concerns.
This deficiency dramatizes the need for the development of an African capacity to deal with regional crises in a timely manner.
In the wake of increased US involvement, the impact of the tragedy in Somalia, and the South Africa, respectively). Action by a small number of individual states tends to raise problems regarding legitimacy, because in these operations it becomes easier to mask selfserving interests under the cloak of "humanitarian" or "security" interests.
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PEACEKEEPING THROUGH PEACE-ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
Conflicts in Africa are usually isolated within a single country's borders and involve belligerents with limited ability to control all the combatants effectively. An intervention force with superior arms with the ability to respond rapidly to outbreaks of hostility will command greater respect from and compel quicker compliance from the belligerent parties in such conflicts. 
OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF (NIGERIA)
Nigeria is not only the key to ECOMOG, it is the cornerstone" of the regional peacekeeping force, and the United States should do all it can to support Nigeria's continuing involvement in it and other international peacekeeping efforts.
-USAIS, Pickering says US wants to work with Nigerian military, Nov 99
The Hammarskjold, in furtherance of his strategy of "preventive diplomacy." This succeeded not only in keeping the Congo conflict from spreading into the adjoining states but also in preserving the unity of the country. 30 Then good relationship between the US and Nigeria was dampened when the Babangida regime annulled the 12 June 1993 election result and the Abacha regime embarked on repressive rule and abuse of human rights. The US rightly refused to continue cooperation with governments that used their enhanced military capacity to subvert democratic ideals and brutalize the same people they were supposed to protect.
Thus Nigeria did not meet the three basic criteria to participate in the African Crisis
Response Initiative: a democratic civilian government, respect for human rights, and a significant military capacity. Four years later Nigeria's international status significantly improved. Military dictatorship has given way to elected governments at all levels, and the rule of law prevails in a country previously notorious for its human rights violations.
So the US has indicated its intent to enhance the capabilities of the Nigerian Armed
Forces. Nigeria has demonstrated an important commitment to regional stability and peacekeeping, spending an estimated $10 billion over the last ten years on peacekeeping operations. The Nigerian military, with the size, experience and readiness to undertake peacekeeping and stability missions, has become an important partner for US engagement.
Nigeria has offered at least five battalions for service in Sierra Leone as part of the USAMSIL peacekeeping mission. DOD is training and equipping these troops on a priority basis. With ACRI focusing on peacekeeping , virtually every country that voluntarily agreed to participate was selected, providing the three criteria were met. Countries that were large enough to produce, maintain, and deploy a peacekeeping capability either did not volunteer or were not selected, such as Nigeria, South Africa, and until lately Kenya. Unfortunately, the countries most capable of regional peacekeeping operations have not received the benefit of ACRI or RECAMP training. The regional anchor countries of Nigeria, South Africa, and Ethiopia are also the most capable of stabilizing the region.
Lacking a single country capable of providing the necessary resources, the region is faced with the dilemma of relying either on a sub-regional organization such as ECOWAS, or a regional organization such as the OAU or UN. Even though these organizations might be pressed to provide resources for the employment of peacekeeping forces, they would be severely strained to sustain those operations.
PEACEKEEPERS OR PEACE-ENFORCERS
The level of ACRI training (conducting Chapter VI -peacekeeping) was selected because of two important factors: First, the inter-agency working group was probably concerned that if the capability was used by one country to destabilize another, funding for the entire program might be jeopardized. Second, Congressional approval was for funding non-lethal training and equipment. Therefore, Department of State, the Executive Agent, determined
Chapter VI-level training to be appropriate.
Training was thus focused on giving selected African nations the ability to respond to and monitor crises in Africa, with the consent of all major parties. Training in those selected countries was focused on battalion level, multi-echelon levels, and on those tasks which were mission-essential to peacekeeping. In accordance with Chapter VI, peacekeeping operations must be conducted with consent of the major parties, and the primary role of the peacekeepers would be to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement, while supporting diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeepers are obliged to maintain agreements and to rely on the principals of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force. 
STRATEGY ADJUSTMENTS
At the time ACRI was introduced in 1996, the OAU was ineffective in responding to crises. The OAU could not achieve the synergistic effect of contributing nations to produce a peacekeeping capability, and peacekeeping was conducted on a bi-lateral basis. The inability of the UN to conduct peace-enforcement operation, or to maintain stability and protect the civilian population of Sierra Leone has produced a situation where the US is equipping and training
Nigerian military forces to conduct UN Chapter VII operations. Sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS, and by military extension, ECOMOG appear to have the greatest influence in their regions. Nigeria is the influential country within ECOWAS, and South Africa within SADC. They have emerged as anchor states due to many factors, the military might being one of the most significant.
Two factors greatly influence the abilities of any organization to affect events in Africa:, its ability to build a consensus and its willingness to expend resources. To execute any engagement strategy, particularly military, both in shaping and responding to the environment, the ability to build a consensus in a timely manner is critical to the future of peace operations in Africa. The US must develop multifaceted approach on several levels, ranging from the UN DPKO, through the OAU Crisis Management, through sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC, though the National Command Authorities of countries selected to receive training in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement would be the optimum solution. ACRI has strengthened the abilities of selected African countries to conduct peacekeeping. The US now needs to focus on assisting Africa on building the operational employment mechanism to most effectively use ACRI capabilities. The US should provide African leadership with guidance on how best to address the issue of employment of an African peace-enforcement capability.
US partners in the UK and France should join the US in developing this strategy of engagement in Africa. The multi-national approach is critical not only to assume the efficient use of limited resources, but also to gain greater effectiveness through unity of effort. Even at the tactical level, the US and France are introducing similar peacekeeping systems through ACRI and RECAMP. Without more cooperation, these systems may prove to be incompatible, with devastating results in future deployments.
CONCLUSION
The United States has interests in Africa, and those interests will become increasingly important in the future. Oils exports, prevention of human suffering, refugee flows, and HIV/Aids all have global implications. Although US policy-makers generally agree that Africa will be increasingly important in the future, there is probably a similar acknowledgment that direct US military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely. The policy decision then becomes how the US should use its military element of power in a region where failed states are more frequent and consent of major parties for peaceful agreements are growing more infrequent.
There is a tremendous risk involved in enhancing the African military capacity, through selective engagement, to successfully perform peace-enforcement operations. The US must insist that
Africans leaders specify what assistance they require. Rather than engaging on a bi-lateral basis, the US should focus on strengthening African regional organizations. Also the US, UK, and France must take a more coordinated and unified approach to enabling Africa to deal with its problems, especially in the area of peace operations for no other reason than to insure that training and equipment is compatible. The US must accept risks and make the best decisions possible. Otherwise the US will neglect a region struggling for stability, prosperity, and even democracy.
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